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IN THE SUPREME CO:URT 
EARL RICH,· 
-vs-
Plaintiff and 
Respondent, 
ERNEST ELDER, 
Defendant and 
Appellant. 
Case 
No. 8671 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT 
Throughout this Brief plaintiff, Earl Rich, will be 
referred to as plain tiff and defendant, Ernest Elder, 
will be referred to as defendant or Elder. 
This appeal arises out of a judgment in the amount 
of $992.34 against the defendant and in favor of plain-
tiff entered on ·the 13th day of February, 1957. From 
the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Decree 
defendant Elder prosecutes this appeal. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The basic question from which this appeal was 
taken concerned the finding of the Trial Court that 
plaintiff was employed by defendant from approximately 
the lOth day of July, 1956 to the 18th day of July, 1957 
and whether or not the plaintiff has earned a bonus. 
All agreements between plaintiff and defendant 
were oral. 
From November of 1955 through the 15th day of 
June, 1956 defendant employed plaintiff on his ranch 
in Carbon and Duchesne Counties. Defendant paid 
plaintiff $200.00 a month and paid plaintiff's wife a sum 
of $1.00 per person per day for any employees of defen-
dant who boarded with plaintiff. 
On June 15, 1956 the ranch was sold and posses-
sion delivered to the other defendant, M. H. Sharp. In 
conjunction with the transfer of the ranch, a herd of 
cattle, which were formerly owned by defendant were 
transferred to Sharp. Plaintiff was informed that from 
and after the 15th day of June his employment would 
be with M. H. Sharp. <R.61) Plaintiff and Sharp tes-
tified that Elder said that after certain hay was up then 
the cattle which were transferred to Sharp would have 
to be gathered and defendant would pay for the gather-
ing. <R.61) Defendant denies that he agreed to pay for 
the gathering. 
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From the 15th day of June, 1956 to approximately 
the 6th day of July, 1956 plaintiff was in the employee 
of Sharp. On the lOth day of July, 1956 plaintiff claims 
that he returned to the employment of defendant. That 
he remained in the employment of defendant from the 
lOth of July to the 18th of July and hired other people to 
work for Elder and incurred obligations for their food and 
incidental expenses on behalf of Elder. On the 26th of 
July plaintiff was again back in the employment of Sharp 
and assisted Sharp in the removal of certain of the cattle 
sold and delivered by Elder to Sharp on the 15th of June, 
1956. Defendant Elder denies that he ever employed 
plaintiff after the 15th of June and from that time on 
whatever work was done on the ranch in Carbon and 
Duchesne Counties or with cattle transferred was on 
behalf of Sharp. 
Concerning the bonus. On January 17, 1956 de-
fendant wrote to the plaintiff and made an offer which 
is contained in plaintiff's Exhibit No. 1, the offer con-
tained the following language: 
"In any event I would be willing to agree to 
pay you in addition to salary $500.00 if at any 
time I sold the property." 
The letter contained several other matters upon which 
there was indicated it would be necessary to have a 
meeting of the minds between plaintiff and defendant 
and closed with the following phrase: 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
4 
"Let me hear from you." 
Plaintiff never did respond to the letter of January 17, 
1956. He continued on the ranch of defendant up 
through the 15th of June, 1956. During the month of 
March, 1956 defendant contemplated the employment 
of another person to take over the operation of the ranch 
and to be foreman over plaintiff, but the employment was 
not consumated because the employee could not come 
to work. 
On June 15th plaintiff was paid by defendant and 
no mention was made of the bonus or any claim for it 
by the plaintiff. The June 15th payment was the last 
payment that was ever made by defendant to plaintiff. 
Thereafter there were conversations between plaintiff and 
defendant concerning the work which plaintiff did be-
tween the lOth day of July and the 18th of July. Plain-
tiff was making demands upon the defendant for the 
sums he claimed due for his wages and for monies which 
he claimed to have obligated defendant to pay. In none 
of these conversations was there any discussion of the 
bonus which plaintiff claimed and which tl1e Trial Court 
awarded him. 
The position of the defendant concerning the 
claim for wages was that the work performed from the 
lOth of July to the 18th of July was performed for Sharp. 
It consisted of the gathering of cattle owned by Sharp 
on which he sought a count both to check the nu1nber 
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of cattle sold by defendant in June of 1956 and also so 
that a loan could be negotiated. 
Defendant's position concerning the bonus was 
that while the bonus was discussed with plaintiff there 
never was any bonus become due. First, defendant 
never had agreed to pay the bonus which was offered 
on January 17, 1956. Second, that the bonus was con-
tingent upon the plaintiff rendering faithful, loyal and 
expert services to the defendant in the handling of the 
Nine Mile Ranch and the cattle thereon, and plaintiff 
did not render faithful. loyal and expert service in the 
handling of the cattle and refused to even discuss with 
defendant the numbers of cattle there were handled on 
the ranch. He failed to reveal to defendant exactly what 
had happened during the spring of 1956. It was also 
defendant's position that the bonus was contingent upon 
plaintiff not continuing in the employment of any trans-
feree of the Nine Mile Ranch. 
The only evidence concerning the obligations of de-
fendant to pay plaintiff for the work performed between 
the lOth of July and the 18th of July and to show plain-
tiff's authority to obligate defendant to pay additional 
wages were two conversations. The conversations oc-
curred, one on the 15th of June, 1956 and the other on 
the 4th of July, 1956. The conversation of July 4th was 
by telephone. Plaintiff called defendant from Price, Utah. 
Plaintiff claims that defendant agreed to employ him to 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
6 
gather cattle and authorized him to employ anybody 
he saw fit to assist him. It is undisputed during the con-
versation defendant limited any expenditure on the part 
of plaintiff for food and supplies to $25.00. 
Between the lOth of July and the 18th of July plain-
tiff and several other men employed by him gathered 
certain of the cattle which were conveyed by defendant 
to Sharp. Present during the time that the cattle were 
gathered were the plaintiff, persons employed by him 
and Sharp. On the last day of the gather, the day that 
the count was to be made John Holmquist, a represen-
tative of Sharp's lending agency and Robert Elder, de-
fendant's seventeen year old son, were present. Defen-
dant stayed away intentionally because he did not be-
lieve a count feasible. 
Defendant has steadfastly denied that he ever au-
thorized plaintiff to employ anyone on his behalf or em-
ployed plaintiff to gather the cattle belonging to Sharp 
on the lOth of July, 1956. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
POINT I 
N·O CONTRACT OF EMPLOYMENT WAS EVER 
SHOWN BETWEEN PLAINTIFF AND DEFENDANT. 
POINT II 
THERE WAS NO CONSIDERATION TO DEFENDANT 
FOR TI-lE 'CLAIMED PROMISE TO PAY THE COST OF 
Tf-IE GATHERING. 
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POINT III 
THAT TI-IE EVIDENCE FAILS TO SHOW ANY AC-
CEPTANCE BY PLAINTIFF OF DEFENDANT'S OFFER TO 
PAY A BONUS WHI'CH WAS CONTAINED IN THE LETTER 
OF JANUARY 17, 19'56. 
POINT IV 
PLAINTIFF FAILED TO RENDER FAITHFUL, LOYAL 
AND EXPERT SERVICES TO THE DEFENDANT AND AS 
A CONSEQUENCE DOES N~OT HAVE GROUNDS TO 
CLAIM A BONUS. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
NO CONTRACT OF EMPLOYMENT WAS EVER 
SHOWN BETWEEN PLAINTIFF AND DEFENDANT. 
The evidence which was presented by plaintiff and 
corroborated by the defendant Sharp at no place shows 
an offer by the defendant, Elder, to employ plaintiff for 
the purpose of gathering the cattle which had been trans-
ferred to Sharp. The evidence comes only from the 
mouths of plaintiff and Sharp. 
The conversation on June 15, 1956 as recalled by 
plaintiff was as follows: 
"Q. Mr. Elder told you what? 
A. Told me that as of July 15th, June 15th 
it was, that I was on the ranch, that I was work-
for Mr. Sharp. That all the responsibility was 
his. The expense. And we had the hay to put 
up then and he said they wanted me to go ahead 
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and put the hay up as fast as I could, and then 
they'd have to have the cows counted on the 
mountain. As quick as I could get the hay up I 
was to go to the mountain and gather the cows 
for the count. 
Q. All right, what else was said? 
A. As I remember it, Mr. Sharp come in then 
and he said when they go to the mountain to 
gather the cows they were working for you then. 
Mr. Elder said yes." (R.61) 
The second conversation concerning the hiring of 
plaintiff was a telephone conversation between plaintiff 
and defendant. Concerning the conversation, plaintiff 
testifies as follows: 
"Q. How did Mr. Sharp happen to be there? 
Had you made arrangements for him to meet you 
there? 
A. No. I was there, I stopped there at the 
service station. 
Q. In Wellington? 
A. Yes. When I, I saw his truck coming 
down the road. 
Q. You saw Mr. Sharp's truck? 
A. Yes. So I hailed him down. 
Q. All right. Now proceed and tell me what 
you stated to Mr. Elder and what he stated to you. 
A. Well I don't remember exactly but I told 
him that we had the hay up and I was ready to 
go to the mountain to gather the cows. And he, 
well I asked him about hiring all the men I could 
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get to go up to gather them. And he said all right. 
Then I asked him about grub, groceries. And he 
said that I could come to Price and charge to him 
a bill of groceries to the extent of $25. That was 
about all that was said." (R.63) 
In the cross examination plaintiff further elaborated 
concerning his conversation with the defendant as fol-
lows: 
"Q. Mr. Rich, let's see if we can get a few of 
these details down. You say you just happened 
to be at Wellington on the Fourth of July and 
made this call to Mr. Elder? About hiring these 
men? 
A. Approximately after the Fourth of July, 
and I didn't happen to be here, I was here for the 
purpose of getting ready for that gather. 
Q. And Mr. Sharp happened to come along 
in his truck? 
A. I don't know on his part how he hap-
pened to be there, but I seen him coming down 
the road. 
Q. Well this call that you made now, Mr. 
Rich, you were in doubt as to whether or not you 
had any authority to hire anybody on behalf of 
Mr. Elder or authority to charge any groceries 
to his account or act in any way on his behalf 
didn't you? 
A. I was not. 
Q. You just, well then why were you calling 
him from Wellington to Salt Lake City if you 
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had no doubt about your authority? 
A. To get him to confirm my authority to 
do it. Once more. 
Q. Once more, is that right? 
A. Yes." <R.66) 
It appears from the testimony of plaintiff when 
taken in its light most favorable to him that at no place 
had there been authorization to pay for the gathering 
of the cattle which were, at the time they were gathered, 
the property of Sharp. At best the conversations only 
indicate a willingness on the part of Elder that the gather 
be conducted at that time. 
It seems strange that a person \vho would be re-
sponsible for the expense incurred would authorize the 
employment of an unlimited number of men to under-
take to gather cattle belonging to another person. This 
is not the situation where the evidence is clear there was 
a mutual assent to the employment of plaintiff. The 
conversations did not take the form of an offer to em-
ploy and an acceptance of the offer. 
Defendant denies that he ever employed plaintiff 
or authorized him to employ other persons on his behalf. 
Plaintiff and Sharp seek to show an agreement by Elder 
to pay for handling and gatl1ering of Sharp's cattle. 
Plaintiff, at the time, \vas actually in possession of and 
handling property of Sharp and in his employ1nent. The 
evidence is clear and is in fact undisputed that on the 
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15th of June plaintiff's employment with defendant was 
terminated and he was paid in full on that day for the 
services rendered. 
Concerning the termination of services plaintiff sta-
ted as follows: 
"Q. And you had a settlement with Mr. 
Elder on the 15th of June didn't you? 
A. For the time being. 
Q. You got a check from him? 
A. I did. 
Q. And you considered and knew and under-
stood that to be payment in full for the services 
you had rendered him? 
A. That's right, up until that time." (R.68) 
The employment claimed by plaintiff which com-
menced on the lOth of July was necessarily a new em-
ployment and for a specific job. No limitation was placed 
upon the plaintiff concerning the number of men he 
could hire, the time he could spend and the manner 
that he could proceed to accomplish the work. No lim-
tations were placed, no control reserved or exercised. 
Plaintiff was handling Sharp's property and Sharp was 
present to supervise and control the operations. 
Sharp was present at both the conversations. It 
was in his interest that the gathering of his cattle be 
accomplished. Would the owner of cattle permit a per-
son, not his employee, to roundup, handle and move on 
his range his cattle without having control over him and 
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without being the party whose authority was being ex-
ercised? 
It is respectfully submitted that the evidence con-
sidered as whole does not show a contract of employ-
ment by defendant. 
POINT II 
T'HERE WAS NO CONSIDERATION TO DEFENDANT 
FOR TilE 'CLAIMED PROMISE TO PAY THE COST OF 
THE GATHERING. 
The agreements marked Exhibit "A" and "B" trans-
ferred on 15th of June, 1956, all of the cattle on the Nine 
Mile Ranch and all of the forest, ranges, and ranch prop-
erities belonging thereto to the exclusive jurisdiction of 
Sharp. 
The agreement, Exhibit "A", did not require that 
plaintiff count the cattle which were sold to Sharp but 
only provided that in the event a physical count of such 
livestock should show that there was not the minimum 
number and kind of livestock guaranteed an allowance 
would be made for the shortage. The agreement also 
provided that the closing date would be the first of July, 
1956. Prior to that day on June 18, 1956 the cattle were 
accepted as to the contract by Sharp. See handwritten 
addition to the agreement Exhibit "A". Actually the 
work which was accomplished by plaintiff between the 
lOth of July and the 18th of July, 1956 had no value of 
any kind to the defendant Elder. The cattle counted 
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belonged to Sharp. He was anxious to know the number 
so that a loan could be made. 
Elder did not believe a count feasible as an accurate 
check, Sharp insisted, however, on going ahead; Elder 
got nothing from what is now claimed to be his obliga-
tions. 
The evidence shows that plaintiff was working for 
Sharp from the 15th of June through the 6th of July, 
1956, putting up the hay on his ranch. The conversation 
of the 4th of July was therefore made bet,ween an em-
ployee of Sharp and Elder. The employees of Sharp were 
actually, in part, the same people who went upon the 
range and assisted plaintiff in the rounding up the catt~e. 
POINT III 
THAT THE EVIDENCE FAILS TO SI-IO·W ANY AC-
CEPTANCE BY PLAINTIFF OF DEFENDANT'S OFFER TO 
PAY A BONUS WHICH WAS CONTAINED IN THE LETTER 
OF JANUARY 17, 1956. 
The only evidence concerning a bonus which was 
presented by plaintiff was the letter of January 17, 1956. 
There can be no question about the letter having been 
written and its contents speak for themselves. It was 
admitted by plaintiff that he did not answer the offer 
made in the letter. At no time did he ever indicate that 
he would accept the terms and conditions of the letter. 
In March, 1956 defendant contemplated the hiring, and 
actually had made arrangements to hire, another person 
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to supersede plaintiff on the ranch and to take over the 
management of the cattle operation. The new foreman 
accepted other employment so there was no replacement 
for plaintiff. 
When plaintiff was paid off on June 15, 1956 he 
freely admitted that the check given him on that date 
which did not take into account any bonus was in full 
payment for the services which he had rendered to Elder 
to that time. 
Prior to the filing of the complaint Rich never made 
any claim for the bonus. On June 15, 1956 Sharp em-
ployed Rich to continue in his employment with him. 
One of the purposes of the offer made by Elder of the 
bonus was to insure that Rich would have continuous 
employment on the ranch either by himself or by a suc-
cessor. 
POINT IV 
PLAINTIFF FAILED TO RENDER FAITHFUL, LOYAL 
AND EXPERT SERVICES TO THE DEFENDANT AND AS 
A CONSEQUENCE DOES NOT HAVE GROUNDS TO 
CLAIM A BONUS. 
Following the transfer of the property by Elder to 
Sharp and the attempted count by Sharp of the cattle 
which were sold to him there arose a dispute over the 
number of cattle which were on the ranch on June IS, 
1956. Elder was desirous of getting whatever reliable 
information he could concerning the number of cattle 
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that were handled by plaintiff during 1956. 
Plaintiff stated that he did not keep a record which 
could be relied upon concerning the number of cat~tle 
handled. When asked to give his opinion of the number 
of cattle which were on the range in an affidavit he re-
fused. Even though Elder, at the time, was willing to 
assume part of the expense of the gathering if an affida-
vit was given. This refusal by plaintiff to disclose in-
formation concerning his employer's business and neces-
sary to the best interest of his employer demonstrates 
a complete lack of loyalty and faithfulness, to the party 
he claimed employed him. 
Plaintiff claimed to be employed by Elder at all 
times prior to June 15th and from the 1Oth to the 18th 
of July to count cattle. Yet when asked to give an opinion 
concerning the number of cattle he thought were on the 
ranges he refused. 
The law seems to be clear that an employee owes 
to his employer, whether the contract of employment 
specifically set it forth or not a duty of loyalty and faith-
fulness. Carpenter Steel Co. v Norcross, 204 F. 537, 
35 Am. fur. Sec. 40 P. 473. 
A failure on the part of an employee to render faith-
ful service may prevent his recovery of compensation for 
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service. In fact the rendering of faithful service is a con-
dition precedent to the right to recover wages. Sipley 
v. Stickney, 190 Mass. 43, 76 N.E. 226, annotated at 
5 Ann. Cas. 611. 
The employees failure to perform his contract of 
employment in failing to render faithful service may be 
asserted as a partial or complete defense in an action to 
recover his salary. Neely v. Wilmore, 124 Ark. 460, 187 
S.W. 637, 35 Am. Jur. Sec. 72 P. 502. 
A cursory examination of the testimony shows a 
completely hostile attitude on th~ -part of plaintiff to-
ward defendant. On the 26th of July plaintiff rounded up 
some of the cattle he had gathered and loaded them on 
trucks at the ranch. Sharp, on August 9, 1956, before 
defendant attempted to obtain the affidavit from plain-
tiff had signed Exhibit B. The Exhibit contains a cove-
nant that Sharp had not removed any cattle from the 
Freed Ranch to that time. 
When the conversation between plaintiff and de-
fendant occurred and the affidavit concerning the number 
of cattle on the ranch was requested plaintiff knew of 
the removal of cattle on July 26th. His failure tD men-
tion this vital fact demonstrates better than words his 
lack of loyalty or faithfulness. Why should an honest 
employee refuse his employer's request for a sworn state-
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ment concerning the vital facts which he alone knew 
unless he was hiding from his employer what he knew, 
and acting against the employer's best interest. The 
actions of plaintiff seem even more strange when it is 
considered in the light of defendant's offer to pay $200.00 
on the account if the affidavit were given. Certainly an 
employer should be entitled to the information in the 
possession of his employee in a form on which reliance 
can be placed. Plaintiff demonstrated to whom his loyalty 
ran when he attempted to aid Sharp in concealing the 
removal of cattle on July 26, 1956. The evidence is con-
sistent which only one finding that plaintiff was working 
for Sharp and not Elder. His actions show to whom his 
loyalty and faithfulness extended, and it is not defendant. 
CONCLUSION 
It is respectfully submitted that the evidence in 
this action does not establish a definite contract of em-
ployment. There was no consideration to Elder for the 
employment of plaintiff. The great preponderance of 
the evidence shows that Elder is a victim of conspiracy 
between Sharp and the plaintiff. No offer to pay bonus 
was ever accepted by Rich and no faithful, loyal and 
efficient service entitling Rich to the claimed wages or 
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a bonus has been rendered to Elder. This Court should 
reverse the judgment of the lower Court and order that 
judgment be entered in favor of ·defendant and against 
plaintiff for no cause for action. 
Respectfully submitted, 
DWIGHT L. KING 
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